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QUAKERS AND NON/THEISM: 
QUESTIONS AND PROSPECTS
Jeffrey dudiak
Allow me to begin by confessing that, in addition to some genuine measure of delight in engaging a matter of considerable 
importance, I am uncomfortable discussing Quakers and theism. 
I am uncomfortable because the structure of this encounter lends 
itself to, if it does not actively encourage, a certain dynamic, and I 
am wary of what I am being drawn into, and want to be deliberate 
about what, even inadvertently, I am perpetuating. I have been asked 
to contribute to a discussion on “Quakers and theism” where the 
other invitee, David Boulton, is a renowned Quaker non-theist. I 
am a confessing Christian Quaker (yes, more confession!—and being 
a Christian these days often feels like something that one has to 
confess in the sense of something one is guilty of), so I suppose I 
am thereby at least a certain kind of theist.1 Am I, therefore, being 
pitted, as the Quaker theist, over against the Quaker non-theist, to 
fight it out over the truth of Quakerism (although sublimated by the 
at least ostensible disinterestedness of “academic discussion”)? I am 
not suggesting that Paul Anderson, who organized this exchange, 
had this as his intent; if Paul had wanted a strong apologist for 
Quaker theism, he could have done better than me, and I trust also 
that he has no desire to see this session ape our currently all too 
pervasive confrontational “journalism,” which is as far as sky is from 
earth from the “loving contest” that, in Karl Jaspers’ phrase, marks 
authentic communication.2 But the very structure of this session at 
least threatens us with polemics. And the temptation to this is all the 
greater in that this question is anything but a merely academic matter 
among contemporary Friends. Whether posed as that of theism versus 
non-theism, of Christianity versus universalism, or of orthodoxy 
versus liberalism, the question of God (God’s existence, identity, and 
nature) is very much at issue for Friends, and tends to be played out 
among Friends of different branches, and among individual Friends 
within them, in a way that opposes us to each other. Without fearing 
difference, this opposition is what I hope, not to deny, but at least to 
contextualize, with an end to transforming the way in which we are 
in it. Indeed, though failingly, I generally try to proceed in life on the 
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premise that much of what those who disagree with me assert about 
my position is probably right, so that encounters with my “other” are 
not first threats, not opportunities for victories, but for honest self-
reflection; not first occasions for overcoming, but for undergoing. So 
my question for myself is: how can I, as a Christian Quaker, be more 
faithful to God, and to my neighbors, across my encounters with non-
theist Friends than I could have been without this challenge? In that, 
I hope to be a Friend.
And yet, as a Friendly philosopher, amongst my callings is to 
questioningly clarify foundational assumptions in order to create 
an imaginative space for the cultivation of a future not stuck to the 
past—or in my Christian language: the redemption and renewal of 
concepts. To that end, I will proceed on two headings, providing in 
turn: 1. a sketch of one possible understanding of the way in which 
our modern context shapes the question of theism and non-theism, 
and the implications of this for religious life; and 2. a very cursory 
intimation of a way forth for Friends in a post-modern age.
the aGe of a/theism
There have always been those who believed, and others who did not 
believe, in God, at least in recorded Occidental history, and so in 
this very simple sense, there has always been theism and atheism. 
And yet, there is also a sense in which theism and atheism, in the 
forms we know them now, would seem to be of relatively late vintage, 
taking on a shape that is distinctive to our modern age—an adaptation 
highlighted by our very designation of these terms as “isms,” where 
the suffix “ism” marks that which precedes it as the central, orienting 
feature of an approach to reality, as the lens through which reality is 
perceived and organized, as the fulcrum upon which what reality will 
be for us balances. 
What I will suggest is that the modern, secular age is not only the 
age of unbelief, it is also the age of belief. Atheism and theism, in their 
intensified, modern sense, are both only possible in a secular age, an 
age in which faith—as surrendered immersion in a world of ineluctable 
meanings—has already lost its force. It is not, as the standard modernist 
story would have it, that we had a medieval age of belief followed by 
the Enlightenment and its unbelief; rather, the possibility of belief and 
unbelief, in this modern sense, grew up together in the secular age. 
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What they share is that which makes their opposition possible: the 
claim that it is not only possible (which is already a lot), but of central 
importance, that we make a judgment about whether God either exists 
or does not. That such a judgment would fall to human beings is what 
is really significant here, the outcome of our respective judgments 
notwithstanding. Theism and atheism, as “options” open to a us as 
subjects endowed with the volition to make such a judgment, are 
likewise modern possibilities, and can therefore be named together, 
collaborating in what we might call the “age of a/theism,” or “age of 
dis/belief,” which I am suggesting supplants an age of faith.3
It is a testament to the overwhelming power of modernity that 
both theists and atheists are drawn into its field, are, in a sense, its very 
product, that believers and unbelievers both accept the modern terms 
of reference for their opposing judgments about God, and attempt 
to justify their respective positions on its terms. It is a testament to 
the power of the modern that faith, as I will suggest, has become 
dependent upon belief or unbelief. And it is a testament to the power 
of the modern that an older, and I think deeper, sense of faith—that 
we are caught up in something that precedes, and even makes possible, 
our volition and consent (and that is preserved in doctrines such as 
election and predestination that now ring to us so nonsensical and 
unjust)—has been largely eclipsed on both sides.
Now, I want to take this “power” of the modern seriously, and not 
only in its (perhaps) religiously deleterious effects, despite the way I 
am framing things so far. There are good reasons why the modern 
Zeitgeist progressively swept through the West over the past few 
centuries, and more recently much of the rest of the world as well. 
The age of reason, in addition to providing us with an unprecedented 
techno-scientific power over matter, has at least as significantly given 
us, and continues to give us, an emancipatory leverage against certain 
entrenched and life-crushing religious, political, and social structures,4 
whose taken-for-grantedness (the same taken-for-grantedness that 
qualifies the faith whose loss I am concerned with here!) is well 
challenged, and (almost) nobody wants to go back to a pre-modern 
world. And yet, along with the gains, I want to be cognizant of what 
has been lost, especially (for the purposes of this reflection) from a 
religious perspective, in this shift from an age of faith to an age of 
a/theism, that is to say, lost to both theists and atheists.
This shift lends itself to any number of descriptions, but a good 
place to start is to highlight the manner in which “subjectivity” has 
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undergone a transformation across it. Whereas for the pre-moderns 
to be a subject was to be “subject to” in the sense of subjectum, 
and thus essentially passive, the product of forces that transcended 
it, the modernist sense of subjectivity elevates the subject into the 
nominative position, and, like the subject of a sentence, is the “subject 
of” all of its relations with an externality that now stands over against 
it, at arm’s length, to be perceived or thought or acted upon, that is 
now transformed into its object. What is is no longer simply lived as 
gift and imperative, but is now dependent upon the judgment of the 
cogito, the rational epistemic subject, who is capable of adjudicating 
its existence or non-existence, but also of endowing it with value. And 
so with God too. 
This shift is part and parcel of the slow (but steady), complex because 
multi-faceted, shift from a medieval emphasis upon ontology to the 
modernist obsessions with epistemology, expressed in the modality 
of religious life (I am arguing) as a shift from an emphasis on faith to 
an emphasis on belief. This shift from ontological to epistemological 
concerns was and continues to be of central philosophical importance: 
the question was no longer to understand the place of the knower 
within the world (which would determine how one might then know 
this world), but to understand what the meaning of the world was over 
against the knower. The shift from the pre-modern to the modern age 
in a certain sense introduces nothing new, but it does represent a 
shift in the centre of gravity of its constitutive terms, and so is quite 
literally revolutionary, in that what was, for the pre-moderns, primary, 
has become for us secondary, and what for them was peripheral has 
become central for us. That is, whereas for the medievals, belief in God 
was a response to finding oneself always already and unquestioningly in 
God’s world, for us moderns belief in God is a pre-requisite for finding 
ourselves in God’s world. Or again, where for the medievals “faith”—
as the total, trusting immersion in a world whose meanings are given 
along with the world itself—was the context for belief, for us belief is 
the prerequisite for faith, when faith is not simply conflated with belief 
(as it often is in modernity). In the modern context, it would indeed 
be foolish to have faith in God (that is, to live trustingly in the world 
as God’s world) if one did not believe in God; for the pre-moderns, 
a lack of belief was not a negative judgment on God, but on the one 
finding himself or herself in disbelief.
A/theism, I am suggesting, is a modernist, rationalist invention 
that forces everything to answer before the tribunal of reason, even 
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God, giving us, in one famous articulation of a broader tide, a 
“religion within the limits of reason alone.”5 But when God has to 
answer to us, rather than we having to answer to God, then God—
or any God worth his or her salt—is already dead, as Nietzsche well 
knew (evoking in him both horror and celebration).6 Theists have, 
of course, made valiant efforts to provide rational support for belief 
in God, but if one has to make, is even allowed to make, a rational 
argument for or against the existence of God, if one is going to trust 
reason to adjudicate whether or not God exists, then God is no longer 
God, reason is. God is dead, in some significant sense, as soon as we 
argue for or against God, rather than from out of God, regardless of 
the outcome of the argument. In a paradoxical turn, then, atheism has 
perhaps already won the day, even among the most strident theists. 
Belief, at least insofar as that term takes on modern intonations, places 
the centre of gravity in the believing subject, in the person believing 
or disbelieving, as prior7 to that which is believed or disbelieved. In 
this context it is inevitable rather than surprising that any hope for 
religion would find its locus in human beings. 
How different is this approach, one that dares to hang the existence 
of God upon our judgments, from the pre-modernist one that defined 
human lives in relationship to God, rather than God in relationship to 
us. Something of what I am trying to capture in this distinction of faith 
from belief is captured in Augustine’s evocation of Mark 9:24: “Lord 
I believe, help thou my unbelief.”8 That one would appeal to God in 
the face of the lack of belief in God, that one’s response to disbelief 
is prayer rather than holding one’s faith in abeyance until one’s belief 
is sure, is contrary to the modern mind. Another famous Augustinian 
idea, his “credo ut intelligam” (“I believe in order to understand”), 
though perhaps better known in its Anselmian variant “fides quaerens 
intellectum” (“faith seeking understanding”), also expresses this pre-
modern priority, and helps us to view differently such phenomena as 
the traditional proofs for the existence of God, that are distorted in 
the modern framework which takes them as neutral, rational proofs, 
rather than what they were, a form of praise, or, in Karl Jaspers’ terms: 
“our attempts to express the experience of man’s ascent to God in 
terms of thought.”9 
On a parallel plane, the critical, modern paradigm that refuses to 
allow anything to operate behind the back of the knower therefore 
places anything that can be known—and thus anything that can 
have existence and meaning for us—in the position of an object over 
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against the knowing subject, and thus conceives of God, if God is 
to be known, along the same lines. Modernity, in its embrace of 
the “knowing subject-known object” relationship as foundational, 
severely narrows down the range of possibilities of understanding 
and relating to God. On this model, either God is an object (albeit a 
supernatural or transcendent one) that exists out there in some manner 
like other objects of our knowledge, or else as merely the projection 
of our subjective desires or wishes. Put otherwise, both theism and 
non-theism accept the natural-supernatural distinction—this shared 
conceptual framework providing the ground of the disagreement 
and thus setting the terms for subsequent debates. The denial of the 
supernatural in favor of the natural thus perceives itself as godless, just 
as, on the other side, the affirmation of the supernatural is perceived 
as the only way to really affirm God. Accepting this framework means 
that we limit ourselves to asserting God as a supernatural object, or 
reducing God to a projection of a natural subject in the form of story or 
metaphor or fiction or what have you. We thereby create for ourselves 
a forced, and perhaps false, choice between transcendent theism and 
immanent naturalism where these are pitted antagonistically over 
against each other.
But this forced “either-or”—either transcendent object, or 
subjective projection, the terms on which the debate about God’s 
reality is largely transacted in modernity—is a blunt instrument. 
Taken literally, theistic claims are precisely incredible—an incredulity 
that can be used either by atheists to reject theism, or by someone 
of the order of Kierkegaard to heighten the need for an irrational 
faith. Not surprisingly, modern non-theists, especially aided by the 
truncated sense of “knowledge” that prevails in modern thought, have 
little trouble mocking and belittling such conceptions of God as silly 
and infantile and incredulous—which if taken as objects of knowledge 
they are! But to jump to the equal and opposite conclusion that since 
these objectifications of God are incredible in the modern world that 
therefore God simply is a projection of human values and aspirations, 
full stop, is to be equally if oppositely dogmatic (for the claim here 
is also to know what “God” is), equally if oppositely non-nuanced 
in imagining alternative, and perhaps more fruitful, understandings 
of, and ways of living, such claims. Correlatively, theists end up 
defending an image of God that is already (at least according to the 
Biblical tradition) a perversion of God simply by dint of having its 
center of gravity in conceptuality—which the Bible refers to as a 
“graven image,” i.e., an image we take too gravely, too seriously, i.e., 
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objectively. The Biblical text itself provides as trenchant a critique of 
“theism” in this sense as any modern secularist could dream of in 
its obsessive attention to idolatry. The Scriptures are neither theist 
nor non-theist; it is modern thought that creates “a/theists” in the 
modern sense.
Indeed, understanding God as either an objective being or merely 
subjective projection may not be the only, or the best, foundation for 
relating to God. Rather than understanding God as a transcendent 
object that somehow exists “out there,” or as a wishful extension of 
the human “here,” we might do well to entertain the possibility that 
God talk becomes meaningful in transcending the very subject-object 
structure itself. Indeed, when it comes to the transcendent Other it 
may well be the case that, in the provocative refrain of Emmanuel 
Levinas, “to be or not to be is not the question.”10 One has to wonder 
whether the existence/non-existence categories in which the question 
of theism and atheism is framed are really the most appropriate ones 
to the experience of God, whether they are true to whatever “reality” 
God has for those for whom God is, in another phrase from Levinas, 
“at the apex of vocabulary,”11 or whether they are not precisely an 
impediment to religious depth. 
Belief and unbelief, and their correlates existence and non-
existence, as primary, and binary, possibilities, as foundational to the 
possibility of any subsequent relationship (or lack thereof) with God, I 
am suggesting, eclipse the possibility that our fundamental encounter 
with God be transacted under the auspices of another modality. 
Along these lines I have been meditating on the late-in-life concession 
(of sorts) of the famous American, modern-liberal, pragmatist, 
philosopher, Richard Rorty, who, near the end of a life of ardent 
atheism, began to engage religious thinkers in a more sympathetic 
way. He was not won over to religion, by any means, but rather than 
re-mounting an attack, he humbly admitted that he just didn’t get it, 
that he was “religiously unmusical.”12 What I have been entertaining 
in this essay is the possibility that this situation is neither specific nor 
idiosyncratic to Rorty, but that being religiously tone deaf is endemic 
to our modernity. Perhaps, just perhaps, the foundational nature of 
belief or disbelief with respect to any further religious commitment, 
and a subject-object model of religious knowledge, obstructs a more 
genuinely “religious” moment, centered upon the vocative, our being 
called upon by God, and our “being attuned” to this voice. But this 
would require the de-centering of concern over what we are capable 
of “seeing,” i.e., understanding, as the active judging of the credibility 
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of objective facts, and a commitment to cultivating a more passive 
sensibility, a commitment to developing, in the Biblical idiom, “ears 
to hear.”13 Such a commitment seems to me commensurate with 
corporate Quaker practice, and consistent with historic Quaker faith.
beyond a/theism
Indeed, the modern age, the age of a/theism, may be in its dotage 
in any case, as there are signs all around (and not just in the minds of 
bored humanities and social science professors) that faith in the tenets 
of modern thought is in serious decline, and the post-modern age 
is upon us. On another possible interpretation, modernity, far from 
being on its deathbed, has rather finally outgrown the “angry young 
man” phase it had been in for most of the past three-hundred years, 
when it arrogantly and mercilessly rained down its rational critique 
upon everything else, and now, coming into a more measured and 
self-reflective maturity, it has brought to bear its critical energies upon 
itself as well—now chastened in understanding that its judgments 
are not, after all, absolute. On this latter reading, the postmodern 
turn cannot be employed as an excuse to revert to a non-critical, pre-
modern naivete (as if that were even possible, as if that were even 
desirable), but as the pushing through to a hyper-critical, self-aware 
“second naivete” (to borrow the phrase of Paul Ricoeur14), one that 
refuses to abandon modern rationality and its contributions, even 
while it resists the temptation to idolize it, i.e., to give it the last word 
in any and every dispute.
And this is why the critique of modernity should not be taken as 
just a covert argument for theism after all; the critique of critique15 
must cut as deeply into theism as into atheism as a questioning of the 
ultimacy of (and not the destruction of) the question of theism and non-
theism. For while the question of theism and non-theism is relativized 
under the postmodern, it does not go away. We still either will, or 
will not, believe in God, and will still be faced, as a Religious Society, 
with the ongoing challenge of providing a communal articulation of 
that which calls us beyond ourselves into worship in its full and varied 
senses. For some of us (myself included) the language of belief in God 
and Christ will be essential to this articulation; for others of us this 
language will be an impediment. So whether we use this language or 
not is no matter of indifference, and we must continue to honestly, 
respectfully, wrestle with this. But we can perhaps more sagely and 
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imaginatively do so when this challenge to communal understanding 
is undertaken at a depth that gets us beyond the too simple critique of 
an objectivist religion on the one hand, and the too simple embracing 
and defending of such on the other, as we attempt to transcend 
the overly restrictive options which have been bequeathed to us by 
modern thought. The diversity, traditional truthfulness and trust, and 
practiced patience in listening for spiritual leadings places Friends in a 
perhaps unique position to make a contribution to religious thought 
and life in these our changing, and challenging, times. 
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